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COMMENTS
RAINES, RAINES GO AWAY: HOW PRESIDENTIAL
SIGNING STATEMENTS AND SENATE BILL 3731
SHOULD LEAD TO A NEW DOCTRINE OF
LEGISLATIVE STANDING
Jason A. Derr'
Since taking office, President George W. Bush has exercised his execu-
tive power to disregard over 750 laws.' In April 2006, Boston Globe re-
+ J.D. Candidate, May 2008, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School
of Law, B.A., King's College, Wilkes-Barre, PA. First and foremost, the author wishes to
thank the staff of the Catholic University Law Review for their expert editing of this Com-
ment. The author owes an incredible debt of gratitude to Professor Heather Elliott for her
invaluable guidance and expert legal analysis throughout the writing process, Professor
Richard J. Peltz for his assistance in the initial stages of working with presidential signing
statements, and his Note and Comment Editor, Kinari Patel, for her expert critiques and
continual encouragement. Finally, the author wishes to express his heartfelt gratitude for
the love and support of his mother, Brenda, father, Warren, and sister, Alicia.
1. Charlie Savage, Bush Challenges Hundreds of Laws, BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE,
Apr. 30, 2006, at Al; see also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON
PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE,
RECOMMENDATION & REPORT 2 (2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/op/signing
statements/abafinal-signingstatements recommendation-report_7-24-06.pdf [hereinafter
ABA TASK FORCE REPORT]. It is important to note that presidential signing statements
are not a new mechanism of executive action. See PHILLIP J. COOPER, BY ORDER OF THE
PRESIDENT 203-13 (2002) (outlining various uses of presidential signing statements by
providing specific examples from the Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Clinton administra-
tions); ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra, at 7-14 (discussing the use of presidential sign-
ing statements from the Monroe administration through the current Bush administration).
The first presidential signing statement to contradict the will of Congress was issued by
President James Monroe. ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra, at 7. After signing a bill
into law that directed the president as to how military officers should be selected, Presi-
dent Monroe issued a statement claiming it to be the constitutional role of the president,
not Congress, to select military officials. Id. Since Monroe, a host of presidents have used
signing statements in various contexts to counteract the will of Congress, including John
Tyler, Ulysses S. Grant, Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt,
Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, Richard
Nixon, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Bill Clinton.
Id. at 7-14.
Despite the fact that signing statements have been used frequently by presidents
throughout the 20th century, it was the Reagan administration that spawned a turning
1237
Catholic University Law Review
porter Charlie Savage wrote that President Bush has "ignore[d]" laws
regarding "military rules and regulations, affirmative-action provisions,
requirements that Congress be told about immigration services problems,
'whistle-blower' protections for nuclear regulatory officials, and safe-
guards against political interference in federally funded research.",2 Even
the American Bar Association (ABA) recognizes the existence of "a ma-
jor national controversy."'
point in the use of signing statements from frequently ceremonial to systematically
weapon-like. See COOPER, supra, at 201 (describing the Reagan administration's use of
signing statements as "a systematic and effective weapon to trump congressional action
and to influence not only the implementation of law but also its legal interpretation").
Indeed, it was Reagan's Attorney General, Edwin Meese III, that signed a 1986 agreement
with West Publishing to have presidential signing statements printed as part of a statute's
legislative history in the U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News. Id. at 201-03.
Meese's stated goal was to "improve statutory interpretation by making clear the presi-
dent's understanding of legislation at the time he signs a bill." Id. at 203. Overall, Ronald
Reagan raised seventy-one challenges to federal statutes by the use of signing statements.
ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra, at 11. More recently, Presidents George H.W. Bush
and Bill Clinton far surpassed Reagan's total, with Bush issuing 232 challenges and Clinton
issuing 105. Id. at 11-13.
2. Savage, supra note 1. Recently, President Bush issued presidential signing state-
ments in two additional areas of law: the United States' policy on torture, Elisabeth Bumil-
ler, For President, Final Say on a Bill Sometimes Comes After the Signing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
16, 2006, at All, and the operation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA); Spencer S. Hsu, Bush Balks at Criteria for FEMA Director, WASH. POST, Oct. 7,
2006, at A2. In regard to the United States' torture policy, President Bush wrote a signing
statement declaring that the president possesses the authority to disregard Congress' re-
cent ban on cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment of American prisoners under the
guise of the president's constitutional authority as commander in chief. Bumiller, supra.
The so-called torture ban was initially opposed by President Bush; but later, the president
met with Senator John McCain (R-AZ), the sponsor of the legislation, in the Oval Office
in order "'to make clear to the world that this government does not torture."' Id. Interest-
ingly, President Bush's signing statement was released at 8:00 p.m. on Friday, December
30, via e-mail with the subject line simply stating, "'Statement by the President."' Id. The
New York Times reported that the timing of the statement's release placed. it within a
"dead time" before the New Year's weekend, leaving almost no one to notice its existence.
Id.
Regarding the operation of FEMA, the president used a presidential signing statement
to reserve the ability to ignore a post-Hurricane Katrina requirement enacted by Congress
that requires the director of FEMA to be experienced in handling disasters. Hsu, supra.
Congress created such elevated standards after it was made apparent that Michael Brown,
the former director of FEMA during Hurricane Katrina, who was a lawyer and Arabian
horse judge, lacked experience in managing disaster relief. Id. After Congress passed the
increased standards for the position, President Bush issued a signing statement reserving
the right to ignore such changes. Id.
3. See ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2 (stating that when the first
reports of President Bush's use of signing statements were reported in the national media,
"a major national controversy" emerged); Robert Pear, Legal Group Says Bush Under-
mines Law by Ignoring Select Parts of Bills, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2006, at A12 (quoting
Michael S. Greco, president of the ABA, referring to presidential signing statements as a
'threat to the Constitution and to the rule of law"'). Recent reporting that has uncovered
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The executive mechanism that President Bush uses to disregard these
various federal laws is. the presidential signing statement.4  Presidential
signing statements are:
[AInnouncements made by the president, usually prepared by the
Justice Department, that go beyond merely lauding passage of a
statute to identify provisions of the legislation with which the
president has concerns. They also provide the president's inter-
pretation of the language of the law, announce constitutional lim-
its on the implementation of some of its provisions, or indicate di-
rections to executive branch officials as to how to administer the
new law in an acceptable manner.
a potential strategic underlying rationale for the president's frequent use of signing state-
ments adds to the overall controversy. Charlie Savage, Bush Signings Called Effort to
Expand Power, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 5, 2006, at A2. The Congressional Research Ser-
vice, in a twenty-seven page report, wrote that the Bush administration is using signing
statements to lull Congress into accepting broad, and sometimes dubious, interpretations
of executive authority. T.J. HALSTEAD, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS 23-26 (2006). Specifically, the report states that the
"broad and persistent nature of the claims of executive authority forwarded by President
Bush appear designed to inure Congress, as well as others, to the belief that the president
in fact possesses expansive and exclusive powers upon which the other branches may not
intrude." Id. at 25.
4. Savage, supra note 3 ("A signing statement is issued by the president as he signs a
bill into law. It describes his interpretation of the bill, and it sometimes declares that one
or more of the laws created by the bill are unconstitutional and thus need not be enforced
or obeyed as written."). Charlie Savage of The Boston Globe recounts the process Bush
has used as of April 2006:
[President Bush] has signed every bill that reached his desk, often inviting the legisla-
tion's sponsors to signing ceremonies at which he lavishes praise upon their work.
Then, after the media and the lawmakers have left the White House, Bush quietly
files "signing statements".... The statements are recorded in the federal register.
Savage, supra note 1.
5. COOPER, supra note 1, at 201. Professor Cooper supplies a helpful breakdown of
the "how" and "why" of presidential signing statements. Id. at 203-20. In terms of how
presidential signing statements are implemented, Cooper has recognized the following
methods: (1) "[s]igning [s]tatement[s] as a [t]ype of [fliscal [1]ine [i]tem [vieto," whereby
the president states his desire to spend (or not spend) money on a particular area that
Congress has spoken on, id. at 203; (2) "[s]ubstantive [line [i]tem [vieto [s]tatement[s],"
where the president specifically rejects provisions of actual statutes even when signing the
bill into law, id. at 204; (3) "[f]ixing [o]uter [b]oundaries to [s]tatutes," a method that al-
lows the president to interpret a law within certain, often constitutional, boundaries, id. at
206; (4) "[a]dd[ing] the [plresident's [o]pinion to the [1]egislative [h]istory," where the
president attempts to lay out his view of the enacted law in order to influence subsequent
interpretation, id. at 210; (5) "[a]void[ing] [p]ractical [p]roblems [s]uch as [e]nd of [s]ession
[v]etoes or [v]etoes of [liarge, [c]omplex [s]tatutes," a method that is used instead of a fatal
presidential veto, id. at 211; and (6) "[s]tructuring [i]mplementation of a [s]tatute," where
the president makes an end run around a presidential veto by giving specific instructions to
the executive branch in accord with the president's interpretation of the law. Id. at 212.
In categorizing why presidential signing statements are used, Cooper lists: (1) "[t]o
[p]rovide [r]ecognition for [p]olitical [a]llies and [s]upporters," id. at 213; (2) "[m]aking
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Quite naturally, members of Congress object to the president's use of
signing statements, particularly when the president states his intent to
ignore a duly enacted law.6 After President Clinton used a signing state-
Tnent in October 1999 to indicate that his administration would not im-
plement the 2000 Defense Authorization Act as passed by Congress,7
Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) reprimanded a Clinton administration
official before the Senate Armed Services Committee by remarking,
"[y]ou've shown a contempt of Congress that borders on a supreme arro-
gance of this institution. Let me tell you there are still people up here
who work hard. There are still people up here who believe in the Consti-
tution of the United States."8
Most recently, Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA), speaking on the effect of
presidential signing statements, stated that "congressional legislation
"doesn't amount to anything if the president can say, "My constitutional
authority supersedes the statute." And I think we've got to lay down the
gauntlet and challenge him on it.' '9
On July 26, 2006, Senator Specter challenged the abuse of presidential
signing statements by introducing Senate Bill 3731.10 Senator Specter's
[plolitical [p]oints," id.; (3) "[I]everaging the [l]egislature," id. at 215; (4) "[a]n [e]ffort to
[p]rompt or [i]nfluence [j]udicial [alction," id.; and (5) "[t]he [t]endency to [u]se [p]ast
[p]residential [s]igning [s]tatements to [e]stablish [legitimacy of [c]urrent [a]ctions." Id. at
219.
Summarizing the modern use of signing statements, Cooper writes, "[a]lthough there is
-certainly a history behind such statements, like many of the other [direct executive action]
devices, they have been finding ready users in recent administrations willing to apply them
in new and sometimes dramatic ways." Id. at 230. In an interview with The New York
Times, Cooper commentated on the Bush administration's use of signing statements, say-
ing "[w]hat we're seeing here . . . is a very consistent, systemic use of this little-known
device to expand the authority of the president, constrain the authority of Congress and, in
some cases, simply to supplant the authority of the judiciary." Adam Liptak, Congress and
Justice Dept. May Both Be Overreaching, N.Y. TIMES, June 2,2006, at A16.
6. See Pear, supra note 3 (quoting Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) as saying Bush's
use of signing statements gives the impression the president believes he can "'cherry-pick
ihe provisions he likes and exclude the ones he doesn't like,"' and Senator Patrick J. Leahy
(D-VT) as saying that Bush's signing statements have become "'a diabolical device' to
rewrite laws enacted by Congress"); see also COOPER, supra note 1, at 230 (stating, "[flor
their part, legislators are asking why it should be the case that a president can issue a sign-
ing statement that to all intents and purposes directs an agency not to implement a statute
as it was enacted by the Congress").
7. COOPER, supra note 1, at 200.
8. Id. at 199.
9. ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2-3 (quoting Andy Sullivan, Specter
to Grill Officials on Bush Ignoring Laws, REUTERS, June 21, 2006, available at
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/artcles/2006/06/22/specter-to-gril-Official
s-on-bushignoring-laws/).
10. Presidential Signing Statements Act of 2006, S. 3731, 109th Cong. (2006); see also
Eric Lichtblau, Administration and Critics, in Senate Testimony, Clash Over Eavesdropping
Compromise, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2006, at A21 (discussing Senator Specter's introduction
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bill seeks to accomplish two goals: (1) to prevent any state or federal
court from using presidential signing statements "as a source of author-
ity" in judicial decisions, and (2) to grant standing to the Congress as an
institution (through the Office of Senate Legal Counsel or the Office of
of legislation "telling the courts that in interpreting law, they cannot rely on presidential
'signing statements,"' and also quoting Senator Specter as saying that such legislation was
to make certain that presidential signing statements "are not used in an unconstitutional
manner"). Senator Specter's Senate Bill 3731 is consistent with recommendations made by
the ABA Task Force on Presidential Signing Statements and the Separation of Powers
Doctrine because the legislation, in part, seeks to provide judicial review of presidential
signing statements. See ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 25-26 (recommend-
ing that legislation be drafted to ensure that presidential signing statements are subject to
judicial review); S. 3731, § 5. The ABA report states that this legislation would grant to
"Congress as an institution or its agents" standing to challenge the president's use of a
signing statement that disregards laws enacted by Congress. ABA TASK FORCE Report,
supra note 1, at 25.
The ABA recommendation is based on a single rationale: presidential signing state-
ments harm the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. Id. at 20. The ABA con-
cludes in its report that the separation of powers doctrine requires that the president re-
frain from using signing statements as a means "to disregard or decline to enforce a law or
to interpret it in a manner inconsistent with the will of Congress." Id. The ABA's argu-
ments are grounded in both the framers' intent and decisions of the United States Supreme
Court. Id. at 20-21. The ABA provides, "[o]ne of the most fundamental innovations of
the American Constitution was to separate the executive from the legislative power." Id.
at 20. In addition, the ABA quotes James Madison for the proposition that the framers
believed the separation of powers was "'essential to the preservation of liberty."' Id.
(quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison)). The framers' view on the separation
of powers doctrine, according to the ABA, is embodied in Article II, section 3 of the
United States Constitution stating "the President 'shall take Care that the Laws be faith-
fully executed."' Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3). The ABA argues that this section
of the Constitution evidences an intent "to vest lawmaking power in the Congress and
enforcement power in the President." Id.
Discussing Supreme Court case law, the ABA cites to Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, which states, "[in the framework of our Constitution, the president's power to see
that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker." Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952), quoted in ABA TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 1, at 20. Moreover, the ABA finds that signing statements violate the
holding of INS v. Chadha, where the Court held that the Constitution embodies "the
Framers' decision that the legislative power of the Federal Government be exercised in
accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure." INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983), quoted in ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at
20-21. The ABA concludes that "[t]he Constitution thus limits the President's role in the
lawmaking process to the recommendation of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws
he thinks unwise." ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 20.
The ABA argues that although their view of the separation of powers may seem restric-
tive of the lawmaking role of the president, their stance is fully supported by Supreme
Court case law. Id. at 20-21. The ABA notes that although the Court has stated that
"[tihe choices.., made in the Constitutional Convention impose burdens on governmental
processes that often seem clumsy, inefficient, even urworkable," the Supreme Court rec-
ognizes that "those hard choices were consciously made by men who had lived under a
form of government that permitted arbitrary governmental acts to go unchecked."
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959, quoted in ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 20.
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General Counsel for the United States House of Representatives) to ob-
tain a declaratory judgment as to the legality of any presidential signing
statement. 11
Another provision of Senate Bill 3731 is an attempt by Senator Specter
to navigate the unsettled doctrine of legislative standing.12  Standing is
generally used to determine whether a particular person is entitled to
adjudication by a court on a particular matter. 3 Professor Erwin
Chemerinsky describes standing generally as "one of the most confused
areas of the law., 14 The doctrine of legislative standing specifically refers
to the standing of members of a legislature to file suit claiming an injury
to their legislative power. 5 Legislative lawsuits of this nature are also
often referred to as lawsuits alleging injuries to the legislator's official
16capacity.
The United States Supreme Court has only addressed the issue of legis-
lative standing twice.17 In 1939, the Court in Coleman v. Miller granted
11. S. 3731, §§ 4-5.
12. Id. § 5 ("Any court of the United States ... may declare the legality of any presi-
dential signing statement .... "); Anthony Clark Arend & Catherine B. Lotrionte, Con-
gress Goes to Court: The Past, Present, and Future of Legislator Standing, 25 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 209, 218 (2001) (discussing that there has been "little discussion by courts of
the specific concept of legislator standing"); Carlin Meyer, Imbalance of Powers: Can Con-
gressional Lawsuits Serve As Counterweight?, 54 U. Purr. L. REV. 63, 70-71 (1992) (recog-
nizing, as of 1992, that the "[c]urrent doctrine [of legislative standing] needs refinement").
13. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 60 (3d ed. 2006). Professor
Chemerinsky notes that "[tihe Supreme Court has declared that '[i]n essence the question
of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the
dispute or of particular issues."' Id. (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975))
(second alteration in original).
14. Id. Professor Chemerinsky has identified various reasons why the doctrine of
standing is so complex. First, the factors used to analyze standing have changed "greatly"
during the last 25 years. Id. Second, the Supreme Court has left standing without a consis-
tent method of application. Id. Third, legal commentators argue that the Supreme Court
has manipulated the doctrine based on the Court's desire to review particular fact patterns.
Id. at 60-61.
15. See, e.g., Note, Standing in the Way of Separation of Powers: The Consequences of
Raines v. Byrd, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1741, 1741 n.3 (1999). The author uses the phrase
"legislative standing" to refer only to those lawsuits where legislators sue for institutional
injury to their official capacity. Legislators may also sue in their personal capacity; how-
ever, this separate strand of legislative lawsuits involves settled law that does not raise any
"'unusual concerns"' worth discussing in the context of institutional injury suits by legisla-
tors. Id. (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-20, at 150
(2d ed. 1988)). The primary case for a legislator's right to sue for personal injuries is Pow-
ell v. McCormack, where a member of Congress, Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., filed suit for
being unconstitutionally removed from his seat in Congress after his wife allegedly re-
ceived illegal payments from his office. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 489-90, 493
(1969).
16. Note, supra note 15, at 1741 n.3.
17. See infra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. Cf. Adam L. Blank, Raines v. Byrd:
A Death Knell for the Congressional Suit?, 49 MERCER L. REV. 609, 615 (1998) (discussing
[Vol. 56:12371242
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standing to twenty members of the Kansas State Legislature whose votes
were "virtually held for naught" by a constitutionally questionable action
by the Kansas Lieutenant Governor.18 Then, in 1997, the Court held in
Raines v. Byrd that members of the United States Congress lacked stand-
ing to sue for an institutional loss of voting power arising out of the pas-
sage of the Line Item Veto Act because the members named in the com-
plaint did not have a sufficient personal stake in the dispute. 9
Lower court interpretations of Raines have set the standard for legisla-
tive standing very high, making it difficult for any legislator to meet it.
These interpretations have created a new body of law on legislative
standing,21 generated primarily by the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit.22 This body of law leaves unanswered
questions and significant problemsi2
This Comment argues that (1) Senate Bill 3731, if enacted, will ulti-
mately fail under the Supreme Court's holding in Raines v. Byrd and its
progeny, and (2) the failure of Senate Bill 3731 highlights how critical it is
for the Supreme Court to generate a new and more generous doctrine of
legislative standing to protect the doctrine of separation of powers. First,
this Comment traces the Supreme Court's development of the doctrine of
legislative standing and examines the most recent cases on the subject
from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit. Next, this Comment analyzes Senate Bill 3731 in light of the cur-
rent legislative standing doctrine and concludes that the legislation will
ultimately fail as a check on the power of the executive branch. Finally,
this Comment argues that constraints on legislative standing must be re-
laxed in order to protect the constitutional spheres of power for the ex-
ecutive and legislative branches. Legislative standing can be revived
without inviting endless lawsuits from disaffected legislators by limiting
the doctrine to three baseline requirements: (1) Congress must pass legis-
the Supreme Court case of Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979), which involved an
interbranch dispute, but where standing was not raised as a rationale for dismissal).
18. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433,436-38 (1939).
19. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811,829-30 (1997).
20. See Campell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 32 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Randolph, J., concurring)
("[T]he majority's decision is tantamount to a decision abolishing legislative standing.");
TOM CAMPBELL, Another Method of Solving Interbranch Disputes: Legislators Going to
Court to Sue the Executive Branch, in SEPARATION OF POWERS IN PRACTICE 193, 193, 210
n.1 (2004).
21. See David J. Weiner, Note, The New Law of Legislative Standing, 54 STAN. L.
REv. 205, 213-16 (2001) (referring to the shift brought on by Raines as the "[n]ew [law of
[1]egislative [s]tanding").
22. See Arend & Lotrionte, supra note 12, at 262-72 (examining how the D.C. Circuit
has dealt with Raines since 1997).
23. Id. at 273-74 (stating that the current state of legislative standing jurisprudence has
"serious problems" and is plagued by the unanswered questions of Raines); Note, supra
note 15, at 1744 (stating that the doctrine of legislative standing is "by no means clear").
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lation that is subsequently nullified, (2) Congress must sue as an entity,
and (3) the D.C. Circuit's case law on legislative standing must be re-
jected in favor of the Supreme Court's approach in Raines v. Byrd.
I. THE DOCTRINE OF STANDING IN FEDERAL COURTS
According to a leading treatise, "[s]tanding is the determination of
whether a specific person is the proper party to bring a matter to the
court for adjudication. 2 4 The doctrine of standing in federal court arises
out of the "case-or-controversy" requirement of Article III of the Consti-
tution 5 Thus, the standing requirement is a constitutional restriction
26that can never be diminished by statute.
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the United States Supreme Court
outlined the three requirements for standing in federal court.27 The
Court held:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact" -an in-
vasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized and (b) "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or
'hypothetical."' Second, there must be a causal connection be-
tween the injury and the conduct complained of-the injury has
to be "fairly... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defen-
dant, and not... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some
third party not before the court." Third it must be "likely," as
opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury will be "re-
dressed by a favorable decision."' '
24. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 13, at 60. Through the intent to limit the number of
lawsuits that come before the federal courts, the doctrine of standing serves four major
purposes. First, standing maintains the separation of powers. Id. at 61. By limiting adju-
dication to parties entitled to have their cases heard, standing reduces the likelihood that
the court will hear lawsuits concerning disputes between the executive and the legislative
branches. Id. Second, standing promotes judicial efficiency. Id. The number of cases that
the court must hear is reduced because the doctrine of standing does not permit ideological
lawsuits, opting instead for actual injury and a personal stake in the dispute. See id. at 61.
Third, standing advances judicial decision making. Id. at 62. Since standing only allows
those parties with a personal stake in the dispute to come before the court, each side of the
dispute will more strongly advocate their position. Id. This adversarial positioning nar-
rows the issues for the court and focuses the court in difficult decisions. Id. Fourth, the
requirement of standing promotes general principles of fairness by ensuring that third
parties do not advocate for the rights of others. Id. The Supreme Court held that "the
courts should not adjudicate such rights unnecessarily, and it may be that in fact the hold-
ers of those rights either do not wish to assert them, or will be able to enjoy them regard-
less of whether the in-court litigant is successful or not." Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106,
113-14 (1976), quoted in CHEMERINSKY, supra note 13, at 62.
25. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,560 (1992).
26. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 13, at 63.
27. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61.
28. Id. (citations omitted) (alterations in original); see also Blank, supra note 17, at
612 (further discussing the effect of Lujan on standing jurisprudence).
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These three standing requirements are "the 'irreducible minimum' re-
quired by the Constitution."' 9 Therefore, if a case fails to meet these re-
quirements, it will be dismissed and federal courts will refuse to hear the
case on the merits. °
A final, but critical, feature of standing is its relationship with the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine.3' Standing seeks to preserve the separation of
powers doctrine by restricting judicial intervention. However, accom-
29. Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Jacksonville, 508
U.S. 656, 664 (1993) (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation
of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)).
30. See Arend & Lotrionte, supra note 12, at 214-15. In addition to the three constitu-
tional elements, the Court has also recognized three prudential standing considerations.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 13, at 63; Arend & Lotrionte, supra note 12, at 216. These
three prudential considerations have been created by the Court for judicial administration;
thus, they are not constitutionally required and may be overridden by statute.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 13, at 63.
First, the Court prohibits the assertion of the rights of third parties. Id. Second, the
Court will not hear taxpayer lawsuits that assert generalized grievances, which are claims
that may be raised by any other taxpayer. Id. Professor Chemerinsky notes that recent
Supreme Court decisions have constitutionalized the prudential standing principle that a
plaintiff may not sue for a general taxpayer grievance. Id. Therefore, citizen suits are
permitted only if they are able to meet the constitutional elements of standing. See id.
(describing that the requirements of standing derive from Article III of the Constitution
and cannot be overridden by statute).
Third, a party before the Court must claim an injury "within the zone of interests pro-
tected by the statute in question." Id. Under this consideration, the Court examines statu-
tory provisions to determine exactly which individuals are protected by the language of the
law, and therefore satisfy the requirements of standing. Arend & Lotrionte, supra note 12,
at 217.
31. See Arend & Lotrionte, supra note 12, at 217 (discussing how "the Supreme
Court's understanding of standing has evolved over time" and stating that the connection
between standing and the separation of powers doctrine is one such evolution). George-
town Professors Anthony Clark Arend and Catherine B. Lotrionte recognize this shift in
the Supreme Court's standing jurisprudence towards a greater focus on the separation of
powers doctrine. Id. at 217 & n.43. For example, in 1968 in Flast v. Cohen, the Court
noted that a determination of standing "does not, by its own force, raise separation of
powers problems." Id. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100 (1968), quoted in Arend & Lo-
trionte, supra note 12, at 217. However, by 1984, the Court's view evolved, holding in
Allen v. Wright that "the law of Art. III standing is built on a single basic idea-the idea of
separation of powers." Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984), quoted in Arend & Lo-
trionte, supra note 12, at 217.
The separation of powers rationale for Article III standing was also referenced in the
1997 legislative standing case of Raines v. Byrd. 521 U.S. 811, 820 (1997). In a dispute
between members of Congress and the president over the constitutionality of the Line
Item Veto Act, the Raines Court held, "our standing inquiry has been especially rigorous
[concerning the separation of powers doctrine] when reaching the merits of the dispute
would force [the Court] to decide whether an action taken by one of the other two
branches of the Federal Government was unconstitutional." Id. at 819-20; see also
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 13, at 61.
32. See Cassandra L. Wilkinson, Comment, Constitutional Law: The Province and
Duty of the Judicial Department: Why the Court Cannot Continue to Use Justiciability to
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plishing such preservation is a delicate balance.33 If standing were to be-
come too restrictive, the judiciary would lose its ability to maintain the
system of checks and balances that it provides.m Therefore, a court's ap-
31plication of the standing doctrine must be handled with care.
II. THE DOCTRINE OF LEGISLATIVE STANDING IN THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT
The federal courts have developed a specialized doctrine of "legislative
standing."36 Unlike the volumes of case law on standing in general, the
doctrine of legislative standing has rarely been discussed.37 Legislative
standing is at issue when members of a legislature file suit claiming an
injury to their "official capacities as legislators."38
A. Coleman v. Miller: The Supreme Court's First Legislative
Standing Case
Before 1939, the United States Supreme Court never addressed the is-
sue of legislative standing.39 In that year, the Court decided Coleman v.
Avoid Dealing with the Tension Between Congress and the President Regarding the War
Powers, 56 OKLA. L. REV. 697,708 (2003).
33. See id. at 708-09.
34. Id. Overly restrictive standing would also conflict with the legislative history of
the United States Constitution. See LouIs FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS
BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 10-11 (5th ed. 2007). Virginia, North Caro-
lina, and Pennsylvania desired a strict separation of powers clause incorporated into the
federal Bill of Rights. Id. at 10. The proposed text reads:
The powers delegated by this constitution are appropriated to the departments to
which they are respectively distributed: so that the legislative department shall never
exercise the powers vested in the executive or judicial[,] nor the executive exercise the
powers vested in the legislative or judicial, nor the judicial exercise the powers vested
in the legislative or executive departments.
EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 174-75, 183,
199 (1979), quoted in FISHER, supra, at 10-11. Congress rejected this language and a simi-
lar amendment that sought to keep all of the branches of government "separate and dis-
tinct." FISHER, supra, at 11.
35. See Wilkinson, supra note 32, at 708-09.
36. See Weiner, supra note 21, at 215 (referring to the case law on standing for legisla-
tors as "legislative standing" despite its nearly exclusive discussion of lawsuits brought by
members of the United States Congress). But see R. Lawrence Dessem, Congressional
Standing to Sue: Whose Vote Is This, Anyway?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 1 (1986) (re-
ferring to the case law on standing for the United States Congress as "congressional stand-
ing"). Although from the scholarly literature it appears these two terms are interchange-
able, the author chooses to maintain the use of "legislative standing" for consistency.
37. Arend & Lotrionte, supra note 12, at 218; see also Note, supra note 15, at 1744
(stating that "the future of the doctrine of [legislative standing] is by no means clear").
38. Note, supra note 15, at 1741 n.3 (emphasis omitted).
39. See Dessem, supra note 36, at 3 (stating that the 1939 decision of Coleman v.
Miller was the first time the Court considered standing for legislators).
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Miller.40 There, Kansas legislators challenged the right of the lieutenant
governor to cast the deciding vote in the Kansas Senate ratifying a pro-
posed amendment to the United States Constitution. l In January 1937, a
resolution was introduced in the Kansas State Senate to adopt the
amendment; out of forty senators, the vote for ratification was a perfect
tie-twenty senators in favor, twenty senators opposed.42 To break the
stalemate, the lieutenant governor cast the forty-first vote in favor of rati-
fication. 3 Subsequently, the resolution was adopted by a majority vote in
the Kansas House of Representatives.44
Twenty-one members of the Kansas Senate, including all twenty sena-
tors who voted against ratification, filed a mandamus petition directly to
the Kansas Supreme Court to force the secretary of the senate to deny
passage of the resolution. 45 The legislators argued that the lieutenant
governor lacked the power to cast the deciding vote in the Senate.46 The
Kansas Supreme Court held that the lieutenant governor did possess the
authority to cast the tie-breaking vote and that the resolution itself was
valid.47 The legislative plaintiffs petitioned for certiorari and the Supreme
Court granted the writ.48
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Hughes considered the issue of
standing and held that the twenty Kansas senators, whose votes against
ratification were "overridden and virtually held for naught," possessed "a
plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of
their votes., 49 In addition, the Court concluded that because the twenty
losing senator's votes "would have been sufficient to defeat the resolution
ratifying the proposed constitutional amendment, [it was] sufficient to
give the Court jurisdiction."'
The Court sought to place Coleman within prior precedent, looking to
Hawke v. Smith51 and Leser v. Garnett as controlling authorities.3 The
Court decided that because both Hawke and Leser permitted standing for
40. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
41. Id. at 435-36.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 436.
44. Id.
45. Id. In addition to the twenty senators that voted against ratification, three mem-
bers of the Kansas House of Representatives joined the lawsuit. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 437.
48. See id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 446.
51. 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
52. 258 U.S. 130 (1922).
53. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 438-41.
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individual citizens seeking to have their voting power recognized,- cer-
tainly twenty senators have a more "impressive" interest in maintaining
5
their voting power.
The Coleman decision leaves a few questions unanswered. First, Cole-
man is unclear about whether the holding that senators have standing to
sue state officials applies to the United States Congress. 6 In fact, no
precedent discussed in the decision relates specifically to legislators,
much less federal legislators.57 Finding that Coleman, a case involving
state legislators, could justify congressional standing ignores federal sepa-
ration of powers concerns inevitably implicated in a lawsuit by either
body of the United States Congress against the executive branch.58 Sec-
ondly, assuming that Coleman would apply as a binding precedent for
standing for federal legislators, it is unclear whether "the entire disen-
franchised group" must bring suit in order to achieve standing. 9 Cole-
man offers nothing to help determine what would happen if any of the
twenty losing state legislators had not come before the Court.,°
B. After More Than a Half-Century, the Court Addresses Legislative
Standing in Raines v. Byrd
Almost sixty years later, in Raines v. Byrd, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari on the second legislative standing dispute in its history;61 only
this time the legislative body involved was the United States Congress.6'
Raines v. Byrd involved the enactment of the Line Item Veto Act of
1996. 6' The Act gave the president authority to veto specific portions oflegislation relating to spending and tax benefits, rather than exercising a
54. See id. at 441. In Hawke, the Court permitted standing for an Ohio voter who
sought to challenge the actions of the Ohio secretary of state. Hawke, 253 U.S. at 224, 231.
In Leser, the Court held standing was appropriate for voters in the state of Maryland to
bring suit to have various women's names removed from a list of "qualified voters." Leser,
258 U.S. at 135-36.
55. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 441 (emphasis added). The Court also based its holding on
various cases recognizing standing for public officials and administrative employees, both
federal and state, due to their duty to enforce statutory law; however, these rationales are
outside the scope of legislative standing. Id. at 441-46.
56. Arend & Lotrionte, supra note 12, at 220.
57. Id.
58. See id.
59. Id. at 221.
60. See id.
61. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 813 (1997); see also Note, supra note 15, at 1741
("Raines was the Court's first pronouncement on congressional standing in nearly sixty
years.").
62. Raines, 521 U.S. at 814.
63. Id.; Line Item Veto Act, Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200 (1996), invalidated by
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
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veto on the entire piece of legislation. 64 Under the procedure of the Act,
any effort by the president to exercise his cancellation power could be
overridden by a disapproval bill passed by a two-thirds majority in both
Houses of Congress.65 The Act also provided: "Any Member of Congress
or any individual adversely affected by [the Act] may bring an action, in
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, for declara-
tory judgment and injunctive relief on the ground that any provision of
this part violates the Constitution."66
The day after the Act became effective, six members of Congress who
voted against it brought suit in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia.6' They alleged that the Act violated the Constitu-
tion by expanding the power of the president and violating the constitu-
tional requirements of bicameralism and presentment. 8 The members
claimed that the Act harmed them "'directly and concretely . . . in their
official capacities' as members of Congress by altering the legal effec-
tiveness of their voting power, taking away their constitutional option to
repeal legislation, and changing the constitutional balance of power be-
69tween the executive branch and the legislative branch.
The defendants asked the district court to dismiss the case on the
grounds that the congressional plaintiffs lacked standing to sue. 70 The
district court denied the defendant's motion, holding that the members of
Congress did have standing and that the Line Item Veto Act was uncon-
64. 2 U.S.C. § 691 (2000), invalidated by Clinton, 524 U.S. 417; see also Raines, 521
U.S. at 814-15; Arend & Lotrionte, supra note 12, at 253.
65. 2 U.S.C. § 691d; see also Raines, 521 U.S. at 815; Note, supra note 15, at 1742.
66. 2 U.S.C. § 692(a).
67. See Raines, 521 U.S. at 814. In a footnote, the Supreme Court listed the members
of Congress that were plaintiffs in Raines v. Byrd. Id. at 814 n.1. The congressional plain-
tiffs were four Senators, Robert Byrd (D-WV), Carl Levin (D-MI), Daniel Patrick Moyni-
han (D-NY), Mark Hatfield (R-OR), and two members of the House of Representatives,
David Skaggs (D-CO) and Henry Waxman (D-CA). These congressmen brought suit
against the director of the Office of Management and Budget and the secretary of treasury
(who had responsibility for carrying out the cancellation decisions of the president under
the Act). Arend & Lotrionte, supra note 12, at 254.
68. Raines, 521 U.S. at 816.
69. Id. (quoting Complaint 14) (alteration in original). Quoting the complaint, the
Court summarized Congressmen's claims against the Line Item Veto Act as follows:
"The Act ... (a) alter[s] the legal and practical effect of all votes they may cast on
bills containing such separately vetoable items, (b) divest[s] ... [the appellees] of their
constitutional role in the repeal of legislation, and (c) alter[s] the constitutional bal-
ance of powers between the Legislative and Executive Branches, both with respect to
measures containing separately vetoable items and with respect to other matters com-
ing before Congress."
Id. (quoting Complaint 1 14) (alterations in original).
70. Id.
1249
Catholic University Law Review
stitutional.7' Because the Act contained an expedited appeal provision,
the defendants appealed directly to the United States Supreme Court.72
The Supreme Court held that the congressional plaintiffs lacked stand-
ing to sue.73 In doing so, the Court laid out the broad principles of Article
III standing, discussed the prior legislative standing case of Coleman v.
Miller, and examined two particular caveats present in the case.74
Discussing the general principles of standing, the Court focused on the
personal injury requirement as the key to any standing analysis.75 The
Court reiterated that plaintiffs must have a "'personal stake' in the al-
leged dispute" and the injury must be "particularized as to him., 76 The
Court stressed that strict compliance with the requirements of standing
has always been required. 7  The Court also emphasized that in disputes
"our standing inquiry has been especially rigorous when reaching the
merits of the dispute would force us to decide whether an action taken by
one of the other two branches of the Federal Government was unconsti-
tutional.
78
Next, the Court discussed the case of Coleman v. Miller, the only deci-
sion in which it had previously addressed legislative standing.79 After
briefly discussing the facts of Coleman, the Court distilled the entire case
into one, succinct sentence; it stated:
71. Id. In addition to ruling on the issue of standing and the unconstitutionality of the
Line Item Veto Act, the district court also entertained the defendants' argument under the
doctrine of ripeness. Id. The defendants' argued that because the president had yet to
exercise his authority under the Line Item Veto Act, the case was not ripe for review. See
id. The district court disagreed, holding that the case was, in fact, ripe for review. Id.
72. 2 U.S.C. § 692(b)-(c) (2000); Raines, 521 U.S. at 817-18.
73. Raines, 521 U.S. at 830.
74. See id. at 818-830; see also Arend & Lotrionte, supra note 12, at 259-60 (explaining
the Court's justification for its denial of standing).
75. Raines, 521 at 818 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)). Specifically,
the Court provided: "To meet the standing requirements of Article III, '[a] plaintiff must
allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and
likely to be redressed by the requested relief."' Id. (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 751).
76. Id. at 819 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 819-20.
79. Id. at 821-26. The Court first discussed Powell v. McCormack; however, that case
did not involve legislative standing. Id. at 820-21; Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486
(1969). In Powell, a member of Congress was singled out and removed from his seat due
to strong evidence of illegal payments made to the Congressman's wife. Powell, 395 U.S.
at 490, 493. The Court granted standing in the case. See id. at 512-14; Raines, 521 U.S. at
820-21. The Court in Raines found Powell inapplicable because the Raines plaintiffs were
not "singled out for especially unfavorable treatment," but instead, were claiming an insti-
tutional injury of damage to the entire Congress. Raines, 521 U.S. at 821. Moreover, the
Court added that the Raines plaintiffs were claiming a violation of their political power,
rather than a private harm, which, as the Court stated, "would make the injury more con-
crete." Id.
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It is obvious, then, that our holding in Coleman stands (at most)
for the proposition that legislators whose votes would have been
sufficient to defeat (or enact) a specific legislative Act have
standing to sue if that legislative action goes into effect (or does
not go into effect), on the ground that their votes have been
completely nullified.8 °
Applying this interpretation of Coleman, the Court held that vote nulli-
fication had not occurred in Raines, and, therefore, the case was not gov-
erned by Coleman.8 The Court stated that there was no nullification
because the congressional plaintiffs in Raines were not claiming that a
law passed by a sufficient vote was later nullified by illegal action; in-
stead, the plaintiffs had simply lost a vote.82 Moreover, the Court dis-
missed the plaintiff's argument that their votes were prospectively nulli-
fied.83 Nothing prevents Congress, the Court said, from passing and re-
jecting appropriations bills, creating exemptions from the Line Item Veto
Act, or repealing the Line Item Veto Act itself.84
Even though the Court found that Coleman was not controlling, it went
on to address the suggestion that Coleman permits standing where "sena-
tors [have] 'a plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effec-
tiveness of their votes."'85 The plaintiffs argued that the Line Item Veto
Act changes the meaning and effectiveness of Congress' vote for all can-
celled projects.86 However, the Court concluded that Coleman did not
control."7 The Court refused to accept the plaintiffs' argument and stated
that such logic "pulls Coleman too far from its moorings" because the
plaintiffs' use of the word "effectiveness" was not comparable to the fac-
tual context of Coleman.88
In its conclusion, the Court noted two important facts. First, the Court
"attach[ed] some importance" to the fact that neither the House of Rep-
resentatives nor the Senate authorized the congressional plaintiffs to
80. Raines, 521 U.S. at 823 (citation omitted). In a critical footnote, the Court added
that because the complete nullification feature of Coleman was enough to distinguish the
case from Raines, the Court would refrain from discussing any other ways in which the two
cases differed. Id. at 824 & n.8. Thus, as commentators have noted, the Court refused to
hold whether Coleman, as a state legislature case, would extend to authorize standing to a
lawsuit brought by federal legislators. Arend & Lotrionte, supra note 12, at 257.
81. Raines, 521 U.S. at 823-24.
82. Id. at 824.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 825 (quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433,438 (1939)).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 826.
88. Id. at 825-26. The Court held that "It]here is a vast difference between the level of
vote nullification at issue in Coleman and the abstract dilution of institutional legislative
power that is alleged here. To uphold standing here would require a drastic extension of
Coleman." Id. at 826.
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sue.8 9 Second, the Court's decision left the Act vulnerable to constitu-
tional challenge by someone who suffers a judicially cognizable injury.9°
III. THE D.C. CIRCUIT ATTEMPTS TO MAKE SENSE OF THE AFTERMATH
OF RAINES
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Raines, it has not returned to the
issue of legislative standing. However, two important cases have since
been heard in the D.C. Circuit, which often hears appeals arising from
federal civil lawsuits.9' These subsequent D.C. Circuit interpretations of
legislative standing are the best evidence of how the holding in Raines
will be interpreted.
A. Chenoweth v. Clinton and Its Similarities with Raines
In Chenoweth v. Clinton, the D.C. Circuit addressed President Clin-
ton's creation of the American Heritage Rivers Initiative (AHRI).92 The
AHRI allowed local communities to call upon agencies of the federal
government "to preserve certain historically significant rivers and river-
side communities."93 In June 1997, following the president's announce-
ment of the initiative in his State of the Union address, Representatives
Chenoweth, Schaffer, and Pombo unsuccessfully introduced legislation to
terminate any further progress on the AHRI.94 Subsequently, President
Clinton established the AHRI by Executive Order 13,061 in September
1997.
9"
89. Id. at 829. In support of this claim, the Court cites two cases, indicating that a
failure of authorization was an underlying factor in its holding. Id. at 829 n.10; see also
Arend & Lotrionte, supra note 12, at 259. The Court first cites Bender v. Williamsport
Area Sch. Dist., which held, "[g]enerally speaking, members of collegial bodies do not have
standing to perfect an appeal the body itself has declined to take." 475 U.S. 534, 544
(1986). Next, the Court cites United States v. Ballin, holding, "[t]he two houses of Con-
gress are legislative bodies representing larger constituencies. Power is not vested in any
one individual, but in the aggregate of the members ... [and its action is] the action of the
body as a whole." 144 U.S. 1, 7 (1892).
90. Raines, 521 U.S. at 829. See generally Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417
(1998) (holding the Line Item Veto Act unconstitutional where a lawsuit alleging private
damages was filed).
91. See Roy W. McLeese III, Note, Disagreement in D.C.: The Relationship Between
the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit and Its Implications for a National Court of Ap-
peals, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1048, 1066 (1984).
92. Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112, 113 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
93. Id.
94. See generally H.R. 1842, 105th Cong. (1997).
95. Exec. Order No. 13,061, 3 C.F.R. 221-25 (1998). Executive orders, much like
presidential signing statements, are a form of direct executive action. COOPER, supra note
1, at 16. The term executive order is derived from a 1957 report compiled by the House
Committee on Government Operations. Id. Although, as defined, executive orders direct
the actions of internal government operations, there are often instances where internal
government directives also affect private individuals. See id.
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Representatives Chenoweth, Schaffer, and Pombo filed suit against the
president claiming that he had no statutory authority to issue Executive
Order 13,061.9 Specifically, the representatives claimed the president's
action "'deprived [the plaintiffs] of their constitutionally guaranteed re-
sponsibility of open debate and vote on issues and legislation' involving
interstate commerce, federal lands, the expenditure of federal monies,
and implementation of the [National Environmental Policy Act]."97
The district court granted the president's motion to dismiss on the
grounds that the representatives' claimed right to vote on the AHRI was
"too abstract and not sufficiently specific" to meet the requirements of
Article III standing.98 The representatives appealed to the D.C. Circuit.99
The D.C. Circuit affirmed the ruling of the district court, holding that
the members' claim of a dilution of their voting authority was "indistin-
guishable from the claim to standing the Supreme Court rejected in
Raines."'° The Court began its analysis with an extensive discussion of
Raines' effect on prior D.C. Circuit decisions on legislative standing.'°
A recent example of the broad effect of executive orders is President George W. Bush's
use of executive orders to jumpstart a faith-based service initiative, which was created by
two executive orders that sought to increase federal government cooperation with faith-
based organizations. See generally Exec. Order No. 13,198, 3 C.F.R. 750-52 (2002); Exec.
Order No. 13,199,3 C.F.R. 752-54 (2002).
Professor Phillip J. Cooper has noted that executive orders have many more uses, in-
cluding: (1) the issuance of binding pronouncements to the executive branch; (2) the mak-
ing of policy in areas of generally accepted presidential concern; (3) the initiation or direc-
tion of regulation, (4) the delegation of authority "to address behavior of those outside the
executive branch," through orders to government officials; (5) the reorganizing of agen-
cies; (6) the "management of federal personnel;" (7) control of the military; (8) the imple-
mentation of foreign policy; and (9) "[t]o [s]et aside, [m]anage, [a]llocate or to [dlispose of
physical assets or real property." COOPER, supra note 1, at 21-37.
96. Chenoweth, 181 F.3d at 113.
97. Id.
98. Chenoweth v. Clinton, 997 F. Supp. 36, 39 (D. D.C. 1998), quoted in Chenoweth,
181 F.3d at 113.
99. Chenoweth, 181 F.3d at 113.
100. Id. at 117.
101. Id. at 115-17. The Chenoweth court focused mainly on Kennedy v. Sampson and
Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives. Id. at 112-13. In Kennedy, the D.C. Circuit
broadly permitted legislative standing by a U.S. Senator when he claimed that a presiden-
tial pocket veto created a "diminution of congressional influence in the legislative proc-
ess." Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 435 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In Moore, the court also
allowed standing by Congressmen to challenge an "unconstitutional origination of [a reve-
nue bill] in the Senate." Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 952 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
However, while the court in Moore permitted standing, it ultimately dismissed the
plaintiff's case under the doctrine of equitable discretion. Id. at 958-59; see also
Chenoweth, 181 F.3d at 114-15. The D.C. Circuit's equitable discretion doctrine is a blend-
ing of the doctrines of standing and.separation of powers created in Riegle v. Federal Open
Market Committee, in which the court concluded, "[w]here a congressional plaintiff could
obtain substantial relief from his fellow legislators through the enactment, repeal, or
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Ultimately, the D.C. Circuit concluded that Raines overruled the Court's
prior legislative standing precedent by implication.'9 The court held that
if Raines denied standing where Congress was deprived of its constitu-
tional role as a legislature, then the plaintiffs in Chenoweth must likewise
be denied standing for a claim of a mere "right[] to participate and vote
on legislation in a manner defined by the Constitution."' 3
amendment of a statute, this court should exercise its equitable discretion to dismiss the
legislator's action." 656 F.2d 873, 881 (1981); see also Dessem, supra note 36, at 9-13. The
Riegle court's adoption of the equitable discretion doctrine stems from an influential arti-
cle written by D.C. Circuit Judge McGowan. Meyer, supra note 12, at 84-85. Judge
McGowan's formulation of the doctrine is that the courts should not place any special
burden on congressional plaintiffs, but instead, courts should grant standing where the
elements are met and use their equitable discretion to refuse relief when it appears the
political process has not fully been able to deal with the issue. Id. at 85. Therefore, the
doctrine of equitable discretion is a mechanism for blending the separation of powers into
a legislative standing analysis. See id. (stating that Judge McGowan's article urged the
courts to use discretion "as a tool to address.., separation of powers concerns").
102. Chenoweth, 181 F.3d at 115; see also Arend & Lotrionte, supra note 12, at 263
(stating that Chenoweth recognizes that after Raines the holdings of Kennedy and Moore
are "no longer valid").
103. Chenoweth, 181 F.3d at 115 (quoting Moore, 733 F.2d at 951) (alteration in origi-
nal). In the final section of Chenoweth, despite the court's unwillingness to apply Kennedy
and Moore to the claim of a loss of voting power, the court discussed in dicta the extent to
which particular aspects of Kennedy and Moore may still be good law. Chenoweth, 181
F.3d at 116-17.
First, the court examined the effect that Raines may have on the equitable discretion
doctrine in Moore. Id. at 116. On this point, the court states that Moore and Kennedy may
remain good law because Moore's equitable discretion doctrine and the application of
Raines yield the same result in Chenoweth. Id. Applying Moore's equitable discretion
doctrine, the court noted that Chenoweth would be dismissed because "the parties' dispute
is ... fully susceptible to political resolution." Id. The court wrote that Raines' analysis
creates the same result in the present case because, as mentioned previously, Raines does
not permit standing where a member of Congress is "divest[ed] of [a] constitutional role."
Id. at 115.
The court interpreted the interrelationship of these doctrines to mean that it is possible
that the D.C. Circuit, instead of overruling Moore entirely, merely merged the analysis of
equitable discretion, which stems from a separation of powers concern, with the Raines
formulation of standing. Id. at 116. However, the court notes that since the Supreme
Court held there was no standing in Raines, it did not need "to consider the applicability
(or the validity) of the doctrine of equitable discretion." Id. at 115.
Second, the court considers the possibility that Kennedy retains precedential value in
light of Raines. Id. at 116-17. The court concluded that Kennedy may be considered a
narrow rule in the spirit of Coleman v. Miller. Id. at 116. Raines interprets Coleman's
holding to create a "complete nullifi[cation]" standard. Id. (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521
U.S. 811, 823 (1997)). Based upon this reading of Coleman in Raines, the court finds that
Kennedy may still be viable. Id. at 116-17. The court states that because it was the presi-
dent's pocket veto that stopped the bill from becoming law in Kennedy, and not a failure
by certain members to get legislative support, the majority that voted for the bill may be
able to argue their votes were completely nullified by the president's action. Id.
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B. Campbell v. Clinton: Defining "Completely Nullified"
Only one year after Chenoweth, Campbell v. Clinton provided the D.C.
Circuit with another opportunity to address legislative standing.'0 There,
President Clinton's direction of United States military involvement in the
NATO campaign in Yugoslavia was questioned.05 On March 24, 1999,
President Clinton initiated air attacks on Yugoslav targets.0 6 Two days
later, the president submitted a report to Congress, pursuant to the War
Powers Resolution (WPR) that contained details about the deployment
of the U.S. Armed Forces.' °7 Under the applicable portions of the WPR,
as the court described them, the president must submit a report within
forty-eight hours in any instance where the U.S. Armed Forces are in-
volved in hostilities or even circumstances where hostilities may be immi-
nent.'m In addition, the president is required to terminate all use of the
U.S. Armed Forces within sixty days of filing such a report, unless Con-
gress has either declared war or granted specific authorization to the
president.'1°
The plaintiffs, thirty-one congressmen united in opposition to the
United States presence in Yugoslavia, sought a declaratory judgment
prior to the end of the conflict, finding that the president's use of force
violated the War Powers Clause of the Constitution and the WPR." The
primary contention of the congressional plaintiffs was that, although the
president did file a proper report pursuant to the WPR, he "nonetheless
104. See Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
105. Id. at 19; see also Ronald J. Sievert, Campbell v. Clinton and the Continuing Effort
to Reassert Congress' Predominant Constitutional Authority to Commence, or Prevent, War,
105 DICK. L. REV. 157, 170-71 (2001).
106. Campbell, 203 F.3d at 20. President Clinton's decision to mobilize the Armed
Forces came after a host of events: the failure of diplomatic solutions to the civil war in
Serbia, Serbian atrocities in Kosovo, and the failure of the government of Yugoslavia to
agree to a United Nations peace settlement. Sievert, supra note 105, at 170; Christopher
Gawley, Presidential War-Making and Congressional Attempts to Halt It, in Recent Deci-
sions of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit: Constitu-
tional Law, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 554, 579, 580 (2001).
107. Campbell, 203 F.3d at 20. The March 26, 1999 report made by President Clinton
stated that he had taken action "'pursuant to [his] constitutional authority to conduct for-
eign relations and as Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive."' Campbell v. Clinton, 52
F. Supp. 2d 34, 38 (D. D.C. 1999), affd, 203 F.3d 19 (2000). The House of Representatives
mounted a strong opposition to President Clinton's decision to get involved in the conflict.
Sievert, supra note 105, at 170. In particular, on April 28, 1999, the House: (1) rejected a
joint resolution to declare war between the United States and Yugoslavia by a vote of 427-
2; (2) rejected a concurrent resolution to allow President Clinton to reposition U.S. forces
for action against the government of Yugoslavia by a vote of 290-139; and (3) defeated a
concurrent resolution to allow President Clinton to conduct air and missile strikes against
Yugoslavia by a vote of 213-213. Id. at 170; Gawley, supra note 106, at 580-81.
108. Campbell, 203 F.3d at 20.
109. Id.; Sievert, supra note 105, at 170-71.
110. Campbell, 203 F.3d at 20.
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failed to end U.S. involvement in the hostilities after 60 days."''. The
district court dismissed the case on the president's motion for lack of
standing; the plaintiffs appealed to the D.C. Circuit. 
1 2
The D.C. Circuit only addressed the issue of standing." 3 The main con-
cern of the Campbell court was what it called a "soft spot" in the case law
of congressional challenges to actions of the president, and that this was
what the plaintiffs in Campbell sought to "penetrate.""14 The court was
referring to the failure of the Raines' decision to define the phrase "com-
pletely nullified."'"5 The court noted the Raines decision's emphasis on
the fact that Coleman did not apply there because under the Coleman
facts the Kansas legislator's votes were "completely nullified.",1
6
Recognizing that the Supreme Court had not clearly defined "com-
pletely nullified," the D.C. Circuit supplied its own definition: "It would
seem the [Raines] Court used nullify to mean treating a vote that did not
pass as if it had, or vice versa.""..7 The court determined that Coleman is a
nullification case because state officials adopted a failed amendment rati-
fication as if it had actually passed."' The Campbell plaintiffs' votes did
not meet this test.H9 The president was not giving effect to a defeated
declaration of war or specific statutory authorization, but was acting pur-
suant to his powers as commander-in-chief and under the WPR.'2 Thus,
no legislative act had been nullified.12' The court further explained that
111. Id. The official ending date of the conflict in Yugoslavia was June 21, 1999, when
the secretary of defense redeployed U.S. aircraft out of Yugoslavia. Sievert, supra note
105, at 173.
112. Campbell, 203 F.3d at 20.
113. See id.; see also Sievert, supra note 105, at 173 (stating the court did not rely on
doctrines such as mootness, choosing instead to "issue a twenty one page opinion in which
it affirmed the lower court based on lack of legislative standing pursuant to Raines v.
Byrd").
114. Campbell, 203 F.3d at 21.
115. See id. at 22.
116. Id.
117. Id.; see also Arend & Lotrionte, supra note 12, at 267-68.
118. Campbell, 203 F.3d at 22.
119. Id.
120. Id. The court noted specifically that nullification could not be shown because
members failed to actually pass a resolution requiring the president to withdraw from
Yugoslavia. Id. at 23.
121. See id. at 22-23. In its analysis in Campbell, the D.C. Circuit laid out what it called
the key to understanding the Raines reading of Coleman, stating:
We think the key to understanding the Court's treatment of Coleman and its use of
the word nullification is its implicit recognition that a ratification vote on a constitu-
tional amendment is an unusual situation. It is not at all clear whether once the
amendment was "deemed ratified," the Kansas Senate could have done anything to
reverse that position. We think that must be what the Supreme Court in..,lied when it
said the Raines plaintiffs could not allege that the "[Line Item Veto Act! would nullify
their votes in the future," and that, after all, a majority of senators and congressmen
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Raines does not justify standing every time the executive undertakes an
action Congress voted down or every time the president exceeds his
statutory authority.
12
In applying the above test for nullification to the Campbell facts, the
court took a strict approach. It held that there was no vote nullification
in Campbell because there were various political remedies available to
the plaintiffs."" Specifically, Congress could have: (1) "passed a law for-
bidding the use of U.S. forces" in the Yugoslav campaign, (2) "cut off
funds for the American role in the conflict," or (3) impeached the presi-
dent for violating the authority of Congress.' 24 Thus, the court concluded
that the "soft spot" created by the Coleman decision was inapplicable to
the plaintiffs and affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of stand-
ing.
125
IV. SENATE BILL 3731 AND ITS INEVITABLE FAILURE TO GRANT
STANDING TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS
Senator Arlen Specter's (R-PA) proposed legislation, Senate Bill 3731,
directly implicates the doctrine of legislative standing by authorizing
Congress to sue to challenge the president's use of signing statements in
federal court.126 Under the current doctrine of legislative standing, Sen-
ate Bill 3731 is a nonstarter.
A. The Structure and Goals of Senate Bill 3731
Senate Bill 3731 has one main goal: to prevent all state and federal
courts from using presidential signing statements as a source of authority
in legal analysis.'2 7 The legislation contains two different mechanisms to
achieve this result. First, under section 4, titled "Judicial Use of Presi-
dential Signing Statements," the legislation strictly prohibits any state or
federal court from relying on or even considering a presidential signing
statement "as a source of authority" in judicial decisions. Second, un
could always repeal the Line Item Veto Act. The Coleman senators, by contrast, may
well have been powerless to rescind a ratification of a constitutional amendment that
they claimed had been defeated. In other words, they had no legislative remedy. Un-
der that reading-which we think explains the very narrow possible Coleman excep-
tion to Raines-appellants fail because they continued, after the votes, to enjoy ample
legislative power to have stopped prosecution of the "war."
Id. at 22-23 (citations omitted) (alterations in original).
122. Id. at 22.
123. Id. at 22-23; see also Gawley, supra note 106, at 583.
124. Campbell, 203 F.3d at 23 (emphasis added).
125. Id. at 23-24.
126. S. 3731, 109th Cong. § 5 (2006).
127. See id. § 4. The bill itself provides that its purpose is "[t]o regulate the judicial use
of presidential signing statements in the interpretation of Acts of Congress." Id.
128. Id. § 4.
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der section 5, titled, "Congressional Standing to Obtain Declaratory
Judgment," the bill grants Congress the authority to obtain a declaratory
judgment on the constitutionality of a presidential signing statement.12 9 It
is section 5 that must withstand a justiciability analysis in order to have
any effect on the future legality of presidential signing statements.130
Under section 5, no single member of Congress is empowered to bring
an action against the president for the use of a signing statement.t ' The
legislation specifically permits suit only by the Senate or the House of
Representatives as a body (through the Office of Senate Legal Counsel
or the Office of the General Counsel for the United States House of• 132
Representatives). Once a proper pleading is filed, section 5 grants any
federal court the power to rule on the legality of any presidential signing
statement.
133
B. The Current Doctrine of Legislative Standing is Far Too Strict to Permit
Standing for Congress
The current approaches to the doctrine of legislative standing are so
strict that a congressional challenge to a signing statement will likely fail
129. Id. § 5.
130. See generally id. The full text of section 5 provides:
Any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading by the
United States Senate, through the Office of Senate Legal Counsel, and/or the United
States House of Representatives, through the Office of General Counsel for the
United States House of Representatives, may declare the legality of any presidential
signing statement, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such decla-




132. Id. The particular procedure for how the Office of Senate Legal Counsel decides
to take on a lawsuit is governed by statute. See 2 U.S.C. § 288b (2000). The Office of
Senate Legal Counsel is allowed to intervene in a lawsuit "only when directed to do so by a
resolution adopted by the Senate when such intervention or appearance is to be made in
the name of the Senate or in the name of an officer, committee, subcommittee, or chair-
man of a committee or subcommittee of the Senate." Id. § 288b(c). The Office of the
General Counsel for the House of Representatives, although created by statute, does not
have specific statutory provisions that govern the Office's conduct on behalf of the House.
See generally id. § 130f (outlining compliance standards as well as definitions applicable to
the Office of General Counsel for the House, but not providing any guidance as to when
the Office is permitted to act on behalf of the House). However, in cases where the Office
of General Counsel does act on behalf of the House of Representatives, such action is
usually taken pursuant to an adopted resolution. See, e.g., Dep't of Commerce v. U.S.
House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 328 (1999).
133. S. 3731, § 5. Additionally, the legislation provides that a federal court's ruling on
the legality of a presidential signing statement "shall have the force and effect of a final
judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such," making clear that such rulings have
the potential to reach the United States Supreme Court. Id.
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despite Senator Specter's efforts to make such suits easier.' 34 In particu-
134. See infra notes 135-151 and accompanying text. Section 5 also raises a ripeness
issue. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 13, at 103-05 (defining ripeness). Although the
doctrine of ripeness is outside the scope of this paper, a brief discussion of its application
to section 5 is illustrative. As opposed to standing, which seeks to determine who is the
proper injured party to bring a lawsuit, the doctrine of ripeness considers when such a
lawsuit may occur. Id. at 103-04. The primary function of ripeness is to make sure that
issues do not come before the federal courts which are premature or speculative. See id. at
104.
The case of Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner provides the two considerations of the
Supreme Court's ripeness analysis: "the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the
hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration." Abbott Laboratories v. Gard-
ner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967), quoted in CHEMERINSKY, supra note 13, at 104. Under the
first consideration, the court determines whether the question presented is a purely legal
issue not requiring a detailed body of facts to reach a decision. See CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 13, at 111. In general, the more the judiciary would benefit from a particular factual
context, the more likely the court will hold the case is not ripe for review, opting to dismiss
the case in favor of further factual development. Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S.
583, 587 (1972) (holding that a challenge to a state election law was not ripe for review
because the record before the court was "extraordinarily skimpy"), discussed in
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 13, at 104.
Under the second consideration, the greater the substantial hardship to the plaintiff
from a denial of judicial review, the more likely a federal court will hear the case.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 13, at 105. In addition, the more speculative the injury, the less
likely the Court will declare the case ripe for review. See generally Texas v. United States,
523 U.S. 296 (1998) (holding that the question of whether the Voting Rights Act of 1965
should be applicable to a magistrate who was not yet appointed at the time of the lawsuit
was merely speculative and not ripe for review), cited in CHEMERINSKY, supra note 13, at
105.
Section 5 of Senate Bill 3731 will likely fail under the justiciability doctrine of ripeness.
As the legislation provides, Congress, upon a proper pleading by the appropriate counsel's
office, may bring an action to have a federal court rule on the legality of "any presidential
signing statement." S. 3731, § 5. By the plain text of the bill, Congress is authorized to file
an action questioning the mere issuance of a signing statement even before that statement
can have any real world effect. See id.
Signing statements are the executive branch's interpretation of the law, representing the
future intentions of the president to interpret the law in accordance with his view of the
role of the executive-not actual actions. See COOPER, supra note 1, at 201. Consider the
2006 signing statement by President Bush to the Department of Defense, Emergency Sup-
plemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic
Influenza Act as an example of how signing statements provide the future intent of the
president, but do not constitute actual action at the moment of the signing. See Statement
on Signing the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Ad-
dress Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 41 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 1918 (Dec. 30, 2005) [hereinafter Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
Act Signing Statement].
Title X, section 1003 of the Act relates to the interrogation of detainees of the Depart-
ment of Defense, and explicitly provides that "[n]o individual in the custody or under the
physical control of the United States Government, regardless of nationality or physical
location, shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment." De-
partment of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in
the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1003, 119
Stat. 2680, 2739 (2005). In his signing statement to the overall Act, the president stated he
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lar, Congress is all-but-certain to be denied standing under: (1) the Su-
preme Court's "complete nullification" reading of Coleman in Raines, 35
and (2) the D.C. Circuit's approach to "complete nullification" in Camp-
bell.136 The D.C. Circuit's approach, although not binding on the Su-
preme Court, remains significant due to the court's reputation as the
"mini Supreme Court" and because the court hears a high concentration
137of federal civil cases.
would construe Title X "in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the
President to supervise the ... executive branch and as Commander in Chief and consistent
with the constitutional limitations on the judicial power." Emergency Supplemental Ap-
propriations Act Signing Statement, supra, at 1919. This signing statement clearly relates
to the future intentions of the president, and constitutes no concrete action unless acted
upon.
Considering how presidential signing statements are used, the plain language of section
5 of Senate Bill 3731 appears to fail both ripeness requirements and, therefore, any lawsuit
brought pursuant to its power will likely be dismissed. See S. 3731, § 5; see also
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 13, at 112-13 (discussing both factors under a ripeness analy-
sis).
Because more speculative injuries make it less likely that the Court will hear the case,
see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 13, at 105, a lawsuit by the Congress for the mere act of
issuing a signing statement is likely to be dismissed because the alleged injury is such a
speculative one, a point made clear by analogy to Texas v. United States. 523 U.S. 296
(1998). There, the Supreme Court was asked to review whether the Voting Rights Act of
1965 should be applicable to magistrate appointments to monitor the performance stan-
dards of school districts. Id. at 299. However, because no magistrate was appointed at the
time of the litigation, the Court dismissed the case as unripe based on the fact that the
Court was forced to speculate as to whether a magistrate would ever be appointed. Id. at
300. A challenge to a presidential signing statement under Senate Bill 3731 will similarly
fail because a presidential signing statement, which is only a future intention to act, will
require speculation by the Court as to whether any harm will ever occur. See generally S.
3731, § 5 (providing that Congress is permitted standing to sue for the president's use of a
presidential signing statement by itself, not the harm that results from actions upon the
statement).
A Senate Bill 3731, section 5 challenge will also fail to meet the second, and final, ripe-
ness factor, requiring a necessary body of facts to be fully developed. See CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 13, at 111-12; see also Gilligan, 406 U.S. at 587. Senate Bill 3731, section 5, in
allowing a signing statement to be challenged as soon as it is written, permits Congress to
sue long before any factual background can be developed, especially if the president never
acts on the signing statement at all. See S. 3731, § 5 (granting Congress standing to sue
upon the issuance of a presidential signing statement and before it is actually acted upon,
thereby precluding development of a sufficient body of facts to as to how the signing
statement may be used before suit is filed). Without the opportunity for a factual context
to develop, an action under Senate Bill 3731, section 5 will be dismissed under the ripeness
doctrine. See, e.g., Gilligan, 406 U.S. at 587.
135. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 824 (1997) (citing Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433
(1939)).
136. Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
137. See Susan Low Bloch and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Celebrating the 200th Anniver-
sary of the Federal Courts of the District of Columbia, 90 GEO. L.J. 549, 564 n.72 (2002)
(quoting JOSEPH GOULDEN, THE BENCHWARMERS: THE PRIVATE WORLD OF THE
POWERFUL FEDERAL JUDGES 250 (1974)); see also Thomas F. Hogan, A View From the
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In Raines, the Supreme Court gave only brief attention to Coleman;
however, the Court's holding is clear." 8 The plaintiffs in Raines argued,
as was found in Coleman, that legislators have "a plain, direct and ade-
quate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes."13 9 How-
ever, the Court held that the Line Item Veto Act's alleged dilution of
voting power did not rise to the level of changing the effectiveness of
Congress' vote.1 40 The Court refused to allow the mere possibility of a
change in voting power to provide a basis for standing, and held that such




Applying Raines' holding to an action against a presidential signing
statement will yield the same result. Just as the Line Item Veto Act al-
141 143lowed vote dilution, so does a presidential signing statement . Thus, a
congressional plaintiff seeking to challenge a signing statement will run
headlong into Raines' holding that any argument that a mere allowance
of vote dilution constitutes sufficient harm for standing extends Coleman
too far.144
Loyal Opposition, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 739, 740 n.5 (1998) (stating that the D.C. Cir-
cuit is "one of the leading circuits in the nation"); McLeese, supra note 91, at 1066 (stating
that the D.C. Circuit has "a more important caseload than other circuit courts" because it
hears a large number of federal civil cases).
138. See Raines, 521 U.S. at 825-26.
139. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 438, quoted in Raines, 521 U.S. at 825.
140. Raines, 521 U.S. at 825-26.
141. Id. at 825.
142. See id. at 816 (providing arguments by members of Congress as to why the Line
Item Veto Act leads to a dilution of voting power).
143. See Christopher S. Kelley, A Comparative Look at the Constitutional Signing
Statement: The Case of Bush and Clinton, Presented at the 61st Annual Meeting of the
Midwest Political Science Association (Apr. 3-6, 2003) (stating that "the presidential sign-
ing statement often acts as an 'iron-clad item veto' because it allows the president to excise
items from a bill without any chance for the Congress to overrule the decision" (footnotes
omitted)).
144. Raines, 521 U.S. at 825-26. President Bush's 2002 signing statement to the 21st
Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act provides a concrete
example of how Congressmembers' votes would be diminished by executive action pursu-
ant to a signing statement. See Statement on Signing the 21st Century Department of
Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1971 (Nov. 2,
2002) [hereinafter Justice Appropriations Act Signing Statement]. The Act provides that
the attorney general must submit reports to Congress after any time that he takes certain
actions such as implementing policies that prevent the enforcement of federal laws or
seeking to contest the constitutionality of a federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 530D(a)(1) (Supp. III
2004). President Bush reinterpreted the language of this provision in his signing statement
and made clear his future intent to view the law according to his executive role. Justice
Appropriations Act Signing Statement, supra, at 1971. The president wrote that the sec-
tions of the law which "purport to require" the executive branch to give reports to Con-
gress for executive actions will be construed "in a manner consistent with the constitu-
tional authorities of the President to supervise the.., executive branch." Id.
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The D.C. Circuit's strict application of the complete nullification excep-
tion in Campbell precludes legislative standing for legislators to challenge
a signing statement . Campbell's stringent reading of Raines rejected
standing for the congressional plaintiffs because it saw three different
political remedies available: (1) Congress can pass a law in the future to
remedy the harm; (2) Congress can use the appropriations process to cut
funding and stop the harm from occurring; and (3) Congress can impeach
the president for violating the authority of Congress.'
46
Congressional plaintiffs seeking to challenge signing statements stand
no chance of arguing that their votes are completely nullified as defined
by Campbell because the political remedies available to the Campbell
plaintiffs are also available to congressional plaintiffs challenging the
validity of a signing statement. First, congressional plaintiffs challenging
signing statements can attempt to pass a law to prevent the harm of sign-
147ing statements. Indeed, section 4 of Senate Bill 3731 uses legislation as
a remedy by preventing all state and federal courts from using signing
statements as a source of authority.1 48 Second, congressional plaintiffs
can resort to the appropriations process to remedy the damage of a sign-
ing statement.'19 For example, in the case of the president issuing a sign-
ing statement claiming executive authority to treat military detainees in
accordance with his constitutional role as commander in chief,50 Con-
gress could cut the funding of the Department of Defense to inhibit the
operation of interrogation programs. Third, Congress certainly has the
extreme option of impeaching the president if Congress believes a signing
statement exceeds executive authority. 51
V. A NEW PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATIVE STANDING
As Senate Bill 3731's all-but-certain failure makes clear, both Raines'
refusal to grant legislative standing because the injury was too abstract
and Campbell's application of the extremely narrow complete nullifica-
tion exception represent the major approaches that have strangled legis-
lative standing within its last breath."' Thus, the question arises: If legis-
145. See Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19,22-24 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
146. See id. at 23.
147. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
148. S. 3731, 109th Cong. § 4 (2006).
149. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
150. See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act Signing Statement, supra note
134 (presenting the exact example used, where President Bush issued a signing statement
claiming he would treat detainees in accordance with his authority as commander in chief).
151. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
152. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811,830 (1997); Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19,22-
23 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see also CAMPBELL, supra note 20, at 193 (discussing the near nonexis-
tent status of the modem doctrine of legislative standing).
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lative standing cannot be used to remedy disputes between the Congress
and the Executive, then what can be used?
Essentially, the extremely limited legislative standing doctrine gener-
ates only two solutions: (1) the political process can create a remedy, or
(2) a private lawsuit may arise that is concrete enough to place the inter-
branch dispute before a federal court.'53 These two remedies are theo-
retically and practically problematic as solutions to dealing with true dis-
putes between Congress and the Executive. Therefore, the trajectory
of the modern legislative standing doctrine must be altered and a worka-
ble doctrine must be created.
A. Problems with the Political and Private Lawsuit Solutions
Multiple problems exist with forcing the political process, instead of the
courts, to deal with a legal dispute between Congress and the president.
55
To begin, appropriations actions are not always an effective option for
116Congress to deal with a constitutional violation by the president. In
fact, they often raise constitutional problems on their own.'57 One exam-
ple of this problem arises from Campbell's facts.' There, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held, in part, that the con-
gressional plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge the president's
initiation of the war in Kosovo because Congress could have resorted to
the appropriations process for a remedy 9 However, as a plaintiff in the
litigation, Tom Campbell argues that this result is an illusory solution
because of the president's veto power.'6 Although it is possible for Con-
gress to use the appropriations process to cut funding for the war, the
president always has the power to veto such a measure.16' Therefore, the
right of the majority of Congress under the Constitution to reject a decla-
153. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 421, 448-49 (1998). The
Court's decision in Clinton demonstrates that a private lawsuit alleging a concrete injury,
in this case one brought by the City of New York for the loss of federal funding, is a
method that may lead to Court hearing the case on the merits, despite the fact that a prior
legislative lawsuit failed. Id. at 421.
154. See CAMPBELL, supra note 20, at 193-97 (discussing the desirability of allowing
legislative standing in light of the myriad difficulties with both the alternative political
solutions and the private lawsuit solution).
155. See id. at 194-95.
156. See id. at 195-96 (outlining the various problems with the appropriations process
as an effective alternative to legislative standing, particularly in the context of Department
of Defense appropriations).
157. See id. (presenting the facts of Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979), as an
example of how a political remedy can lead to an odd, unconstitutional result).
158. Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
159. Id. at 22-23.
160. CAMPBELL, supra note 20, at 196.
161. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1-2; see also CAMPBELL, supra note 20, at 196.
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ration of war can only be exercised if Congress can override the presi-
dent's veto by a two-thirds majority.
162
Moreover, judicial abdication in favor of political process places no
limit on the level of interbranch friction that may result.163 Campbell en-
dorses the most serious of federal interbranch conflict by holding that
where impeachment of the president is possible, there is no complete
nullification and legislative standing will not exist.1 4 It appears contradic-
tory that standing, a doctrine often invoked to protect the separation of
powers, can be simultaneously used to endorse one of the most extreme
federal battles that can occur between the legislative and executive
branches.166
162. See U.S. CONST. art. i, §§ 7, cl. 2, 8, cl. 11; see also CAMPBELL, supra note 20, at
196. Summarizing the overall problem at issue under the Campbell facts, Tom Campbell
notes, "[t]here was nothing that the majority of only one house could do legislatively to
vindicate its right." CAMPBELL, supra note 20, at 196 (emphasis added). On the issue of
signing statements, the Campbell problem of the supermajority remedy is even more pro-
nounced. For example, assume Congress passes a law requiring certain defense spending.
The president has the option of signing the bill into law but issuing a signing statement
ignoring the act of Congress under the guise of his Article II powers as commander in
chief. See supra note 144 (discussing an example where President Bush used a signing
statement claiming his power as head of the executive branch to ignore requirements that
the attorney general report periodically before Congress)t-see-also Justice Appropriations
Signing Statement, supra note 144, at 1971 (providing an example of a signing statement
where the president claims his executive authority as commander in chief as a method of
interpreting a bill passed by Congress). As a remedy to this rebuke, Congress can pass
another law compelling the president to follow its prior defense spending legislation. Now,
if the president were to veto the second bill, Congress, in order to override the veto, would
have to act by a super-majority just to get the president to follow the first piece of legisla-
tion that he originally signed into law.
163. See CAMPBELL, supra note 20, at 194 (stating that when the court does not allow
legislative standing, there is "no guarantee the battle will be confined to the context of the
good faith dispute").
164. See Campbell, 203 F.3d at 22-23; see also CAMPBELL, supra note 20, at 194.
165. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819-20 (1997); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752
(1984); see also Arend & Lotrionte, supra note 12, at 217.
166. See Richard W. Stevenson & John M. Broder, Focus on Impeachment Casts a
Shadow on the Goals of Both Parties, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1999, at A12 (discussing the
difficulty Congress had in moving forward with any substantive public policy issues during
the Clinton impeachment proceedings because Washington was "all impeachment all the
time"). The impeachment of President Clinton displayed one of the most significant prob-
lems with resorting to impeachment-the loss of focus on substantive policy. See id. In the
midst of the debate over Clinton's future as president, national defense, tax policy, social
security, Medicare, and political fund-raising were all major issues that needed the atten-
tion of policy makers. Id. Although the trial of President Clinton was conducted during a
period of the year when Congress often accomplishes very little, former Senator Judd
Gregg (R-NH) stated "[t]his trial has obviously knocked everything off the agenda for a
period of time." Id. In addition, the impeachment proceedings spawned a lack of trust
between the parties that raised questions of whether the president and the Congress would
be able to compromise on these issues at all. Id.
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The modern doctrine of legislative standing permits one other remedy:
private action by a nonlegislative plaintiff. Such private remedies, al-
167
though at times effective, fail to address various issues that arise from• 168
disputes between Congress and the president. First, private suits will
167. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (rendering the Line
Item Veto Act inoperative as unconstitutional following a suit brought by a private indi-
vidual).
168. See CAMPBELL, supra note 20, at 193-94 ("[T]here are ... cases where private
individuals with particularized harm cannot be counted on to bring suit in time or at all, or
with the proper kind of claim .... "). Some critics would disagree with this analysis. Sup-
porters of private action over legislative standing invoke the intent of the framers and early
Supreme Court case law such as that of Marbury v. Madison. See, e.g., Moore v. U.S.
House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 956-65 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., concurring)
("Unless [the powers conferred upon officers of the political branches] have been denied
in such fashion as to produce a governmental result that harms some entity or individual
who brings the matter before us, we have no constitutional power to interfere."); Arend &
Lotrionte, supra note 12, at 278-81. The two main arguments in favor of private action are:
(1) the framers intended the judiciary to determine only private rights in order to prevent
the intervention of an unelected judiciary into the affairs of political branches, Arend &
Lotrionte, supra note 12, at 279; Meyer, supra note 12, at 66-67; and (2) the precise lan-
guage used by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury states that the province of the Court is to
decide the rights of individuals. Moore, 733 F.2d at 959 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)).
Both of these arguments are unsustainable upon consideration of the full picture of the
debate they invoke. The framers' intent argument is substantially weakened by consider-
ing the framers' view on war. CAMPBELL, supra note 20, at 210 (quoting Letter from
Abraham Lincoln to William H. Herndon (Feb. 15, 1848) in 2 COMPLETE WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 2, 3 (J.G. Nicolay & J. Hay eds., 1905) ("[The framers] resolved to so
frame the Constitution that no one man should hold the power of bringing [the] oppression
[of war] upon us.")). Forcing legislative causes of action to be brought by private individu-
als would permit the president to begin and end an illegal war before any private plaintiff
has a chance to reach the judiciary. Id. at 211 n.3. A president's unilateral decision to go
to war was overtly rejected by the framers. See id. at 210; accord U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
11. Cf Meyer, supra note 12, at 73 (stating that the rise of executive power in general was
"feared by the Framers"). Thus, the argument that the potential for unilateral war is pref-
erable to allowing the legislature to sue for genuine injuries to its authority seems nonsen-
sical. Sievert, supra note 105, at 160 (quoting James Wilson as stating that it was his "ex-
pectation that the [separation of powers] system would guard against the possibility of
hostilities being initiated by one man" and also stating that Alexander Hamilton, despite
his beliefs in a strong executive, would often voice his belief that the president, "unlike the
King of England, could not on his own command the country to enter a state of war.").
Second, the argument that Marbury v. Madison mandates that the Court's constitu-
tional province is to decide the rights of private individuals is weakened by the basic facts
of Marbury itself. Marbury was hardly a case of individual rights. See generally Marbury,
5 U.S. 137; see also CAMPBELL, supra note 20, at 207-08. Instead, Marbury's facts required
Chief Justice Marshall to analyze President Jefferson's ability as the Executive to reject
Article I judicial appointments made by the previous Adams administration. CAMPBELL,
supra note 20, at 208. Overall, the case required Marshall to consider how the statutory
appointment of D.C. judges would operate as between both the executive and legislative
branches. Id. In contrast to those critics that invoke Marbury for the proposition that the
Court should only deal with individual rights, Marbury can be seen as relatively similar to
an interbranch dispute of the kind found in legislative standing cases. Id.
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not address the damage to Congress as a body, which is the real problem
at issue in a suit concerning a power dispute between the legislature and
the executive. 69 Private parties will be suing based upon the harm that is
particular to them and not, for example, the constitutional loss of power
to the Congress.'7° Moreover, if Congress cannot advocate against its
own injury, but must rely on a private third-party to make the case, this
violates the general purpose of standing-to make sure that a proper,
actually injured party is present before the court.
71
Second, private lawsuits may arise too late to be effective.172 Presiden-
tial exercise of war powers provides a clear example of where private
lawsuits are ineffective. For example, in the case of an illegal war that
violates the War Powers Act and continues beyond sixty days without
congressional approval, it is possible that the war will end before any
private plaintiff, such as a soldier, can bring a lawsuit.
73
Finally, private lawsuits have the potential to harm the process of law-
making between the branches. Waiting for a private suit can lead to a
gap of knowledge between the branches as to whether the executive and
legislative branches' actions are constitutional. 174 This problem is appar-
ent in the gap between Raines, where the Court denied standing to chal-
lenge the Line Item Veto Act, 7' and Clinton v. City of New York, where a
private suit was brought and the Court struck down the Line Item Veto
Act as violative of the Constitution.176 During this time period, President
Clinton used the Line Item Veto approximately eighty times, assuming
the law was constitutional. 77 This whole period of wasted government
effort could have been avoided if only the Court had granted standing in
Raines.178
169. See CAMPBELL, supra note 20, at 208-09.
170. See id. at 211 n.2.
171. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 13, at 61-62.
172. CAMPBELL, supra note 20, at 193-94. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 13,
at 103.
173. CAMPBELL, supra note 20, at 211 n.3. Campbell v. Clinton presents a perfect of
example of how a war can end before a lawsuit reaches the federal court. Campbell v.
Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 33 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Randolph, J., concurring). In Campbell, mem-
bers of Congress filed suit to prevent an alleged unconstitutional use of the United States
Armed Forces in Yugoslavia. Id. at 19-20 (majority opinion). The congressional plaintiffs'
lawsuit was filed on May 19, 1999, and by June 21, 1999, roughly four months before the
case was even argued before the D.C. Circuit, hostilities ended. Id. at 33 (Randolph, J.,
concurring).
174. Weiner, supra note 21, at 230-31.
175. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 830 (1997).
176. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448-49 (1998).
177. Weiner, supra note 21, at 230.
178. Id. at 230-31.
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B. The Baseline Requirements of a New Doctrine of Legislative Standing
The standard for legislative standing seems to have been set so high
that no such standing could ever be found. 79 But the problem of signing
statements demonstrates that a more practical approach must be taken8
Three major changes to the current doctrine will lead to a much more
workable doctrine that protects both the constitutional power of Con-
gress and the doctrine of separation of powers: (1) Congress must pass
legislation that is subsequently nullified; (2) Congress must choose to sue
as a body; and (3) in terms of analysis, the "completely nullified" test
must be returned to its original formulation by the Supreme Court.
1. Congress Must Pass Legislation that is Nullified
Raines and Chenoweth make clear that when Congress has not taken
action, yet members sue for a dilution of voting power, the Court will
refuse to grant standing.181 For example, in Chenoweih, the three con-
gressional plaintiffs attempted to pass a bill to prevent the president from
creating the American Heritage Rivers Initiative, but the bill never came
to a vote. 82 After the president authorized the initiative through an ex-
ecutive order, legislators claimed a loss of voting. 183 The Court held
standing was inappropriate in part because to grant standing for such an
injury would, by implication, allow Congress to sue in every instance
where a president acted without a specific congressional grant of execu-
tive power, or exceeded a grant of such power.' 84
In order to eliminate the concerns in Raines and Chenoweth, the first
requirement of legislative standing must be that Congress actually act.'
85
In other words, Congress must pass a law, and the president must then
act to nullify such clear direction before the courts will recognize an in-
jury sufficient to confer standing.186 Requiring definite action by Con-
179. See, e.g., Raines, 521 U.S. at 830 (dismissed for lack of standing); Campbell v.
Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (same); Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112, 117
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (same).
180. See David H. Remes, Gerard J. Waldron & Shannon A. Lang, Presidential Signing
Statements: Will Congress Pick Up the Gauntlet? 8 (June 26, 2006) (Constitution Project
Working Paper, available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/SigningStatements-
MemofromCovington.& IBurling.pdf).
181. Raines, 521 U.S. at 830; Chenoweth, 181 F.3d at 117.
182. Chenoweth, 181 F.3d at 113.
183. Id.
184. See Chenoweth, 181 F.3d at 113, 115-17; see also CAMPBELL, supra note 20, at 197-
200 ("By requiring some congressional action as a predicate to bring a lawsuit of this kind,
courts would prevent overuse of the judicial remedy.").
185. CAMPBELL, supra note 20, at 197-200; see also Meyer, supra note 12, at 120.
186. See Sievert, supra note 105, at 172 (suggesting Campbell may have been decided
differently if the president, rather than overstepping his authority under the War Powers
Resolution, had actually violated a clear exercise of authority from the Congress).
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gress would put a stop to Chenoweth's concern that legislative standing
may lead to an overuse of the federal court system.187 In addition, an ac-
tual action requirement addresses the concern that courts will become
judicial referees for the other two federal branches.188 By allowing only
those cases where Congress has taken definite action, the courts will hear
only a limited number of cases where the president has violated an ex-
press act of Congress.' 89
2. Congress Must Choose to Sue as a Body
The Raines decision stated that Congress' lack of authorization for the
lawsuit against the Line Item Veto Act was of "some importance" in its
refusal to grant standing.'9 The Raines rationale appears to have two
unstated bases: (1) if only a minority of the members of Congress could
seek judicial remedies, they would possess greater power in the courts
than they possess in the political process;"' and (2) if only a minority of
members of Congress could seek judicial remedies, the courts would of-
ten be thrust into the role of judicial referee.
92
To solve the concerns of Raines, a second prong of legislative standing
must mandate that a majority of both houses of Congress must authorize
187. CAMPBELL, supra note 20, at 197-98. Moreover, requiring actual action by Con-
gress will prevent any appearance of a generalized grievance, which courts have held is not
a sufficient rationale for standing. Meyer, supra note 12, at 120-21. The rationale behind
the generalized grievances argument is explained as follows:
Because an elected representative is holding his or her political power as trustee for
his or her constituents, he or she cannot have an interest greater than the constituents
have. Therefore, if a citizen cannot bring suit on the basis of an injury to his or her
representative because of the prohibition against generalized grievances, then a forti-
ori nor can the representative.
Note, supra note 15, at 1748. This trust argument is criticized as flawed. Id. The simple
fact is that members of Congress often have interests and duties that are different from
those of their constituents. Id. at 1748-49. An obvious example is that members of Con-
gress must vote on legislation and attend committee meetings. Id. at 1749.
188. See Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives, 733 F.3d 946, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing that one of the problems with legislative standing in
general is that the courts do not sit "to supervise the internal workings of the executive and
legislative branches nor to umpire disputes between those branches regarding their respec-
tive powers"); Arend & Lotrionte, supra note 12, at 279-80 (arguing that it is "unlikely that
the Framers would have wanted the Legislative Branch to use the power of the Judiciary
to take on the Executive").
189. See CAMPBELL, supra note 20, at 197-99; Meyer, supra note 12, at 121 (stating that
requiring actual action by the Congress prior to a lawsuit will prevent legislative standing
from "becom[ing] a mechanism whereby individual members of Congress monitor execu-
tive actions, bringing lawsuits whenever they believe that the executive is not in full or
proper compliance with existing law").
190. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811,829 (1997).
191. CAMPBELL, supra note 20, at 198.
192. See id. at 196-97, 215 n.20.
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any lawsuit brought on behalf of the institution.'93 Both underlying con-
cerns in Raines would be solved by this proposal. If a majority of Con-
gress votes in favor of filing a lawsuit, then the problem of improperly
granting too much power to a minority of Congress is eliminated.'
14
Moreover, where Congress must act as a majority, the judiciary is far less
likely to get caught in a situation requiring a court to hear every case in
which the president exceeds congressional authority because the majority
requirement will make it more difficult for Congress to seek review by
the court. 95
3. Campbell's "Completely Nullified" Approach Must be Rejected in
Favor of the Original Formulation by the Supreme Court
The D. C. Circuit's approach in Campbell, requiring complete nullifica-
tion, makes legislative standing a doctrine in name only.196 By reading
Raines' use of "completely nullified" to mean that all political remedies,
even impeachment, must be exhausted prior to a grant of standing, the
Campbell approach renders legislative standing wholly inaccessible, and
guarantees that only problematic political remedies are available; there-
fore, it must be rejected.' 9'
Rather than adopting a Campbell approach, the Supreme Court should
reassert the Raines interpretation of Coleman.'99 As stated in Raines, the
test should simply state, "legislators whose votes would have been suffi-
cient to defeat (or enact) a specific legislative Act have standing to sue if
that legislative action goes into effect (or does not go into effect)."
2
00
Using this Raines-Coleman test removes the political difficulties of the
Campbell approach. First, the Raines-Coleman test creates a more realis-
tic remedy to checking the president's power than the appropriations
process because Congress can use the direct effect of a court decision to
stop executive action rather than the ineffective remedy that appropria-
193. See id. at 200-03 (proposing the rule that if a member of Congress can get a vote
onto either house's floor, then "he or she must").
194. See id. at 198-99.
195. Cf. id. at 197-98 (stating congressional action alone will reduce the "overuse of the
judicial remedy" without even going as far as if a majority of Congress were required to
comply as well).
196. See id. at 193, 210 n.1.
197. See Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19,22-24 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
198. See CAMPBELL, supra note 20, at 196-97; see also supra notes 155-166 and accom-
panying text.
199. CAMPBELL, supra note 20, at 203.
200. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 823 (1997); see also Campbell, 203 F.3d at 29
(Randolph, J., concurring) (stating that the Raines reading of Coleman is the "heart" of the
Raines decision and that the proper legislative standing analysis should simply be based on
whether the plaintiffs had the votes "sufficient to defeat ... a specific legislative act," in-
stead of a narrow definition of "completely nullified" based on future political remedies).
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tions offers-enacting a bill that the president is free to veto.2° 1 Second,
this interpretation will allow congressional harms to be addressed in fed-
eral courts before the Campbell alternative of impeachment is under-
taken.m
Adopting the Raines-Coleman approach will also address the problem-
atic outcome in Campbell that led to the awkward political remedy of
requiring a supermajority of one house to vindicate the rights of a major-
ity.20 3 By focusing only on whether the votes were sufficient to defeat the
overriding action of the president, a Raines reading of Coleman would
have allowed those members of Congress who did sufficiently vote
against the Kosovo conflict to have their appropriate rights protected in
court.2 0° However, under the D.C. Circuit's strict complete nullification
approach, these congressional plaintiffs would have to use the political
process and would most likely end up having to garner a supermajority to
override a presidential veto.25 Adopting the original Coleman interpreta-
tion prevents what is essentially an amendment to the lawmaking process
of the Constitution by the political branches. 2°6
Finally, a Raines-Coleman test will remedy the problems that private
lawsuits create.20 By allowing Congress to gain access to the courts legis-
lative standing will be drawn into the broader principle of standing-that
the appropriate party is to be before the court.2 °I In addition, congres-
sional suits will prevent the decisional gap presented by the Raines and
Clinton Line Item Veto Act cases by eliminating the need for the execu-
tive and legislative branches to guess whether their political actions are
legally sound.2 O°
201. See CAMPBELL, supra note 20, at 195 (discussing the ineffectiveness of the appro-
priations process as a check on the behavior of the president).
202. Id. at 194 (discussing the extreme political remedy of impeachment and how it is
apparently endorsed by the court in Campbell).
203. Id. at 196 (examining the constitutional implications of the ineffective political
remedy of appropriations proposed in Campbell); see also supra notes 157-161 and accom-
panying text.
204. See CAMPBELL, supra note 20, at 202-03 (discussing the fact that the Raines read-
ing of Coleman should have been employed in Campbell, which would have led to a differ-
ent result).
205. See id. at 196.
206. See id. at 202-03; Meyer, supra note 12, at 67.
207. See generally supra notes 167-178 and accompanying text.
208. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 13, at 60.
209. See Weiner, supra note 21, at 230-31 (discussing how the time lag between Raines
and Clinton v. New York harmed the separation of powers by allowing the president and
Congress to act as if the law were constitutional, only to find that such energy was wasted
when the law was declared unconstitutional in a private, non-legislative lawsuit); see also
supra notes 174-178 and accompanying text.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Although Senate Bill 3731 is likely to be a failed attempt at checking
the president's use of presidential signing statements, its provisions pro-
vide the opportunity for a reconsideration of the doctrine of legislative
standing. Current approaches, such as that taken by the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Campbell, leave Congress
shut out of federal court if it seeks a remedy for institutional harm. The
political process and private lawsuits offered as alternatives are hardly
effective remedies. The best solution in light of the controversy over
presidential signing statements is to adopt a new doctrine of legislative
standing that will protect the separation of powers concerns of the judici-
ary, as well as balance the functioning of constitutional authority respec-
tively granted to the legislative and the executive branches.
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